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Review Staff: 75/2679
26 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO

To prove that the world is circular, in response to our request to the NSC staff to release the attached documents to the SSC, the NSC is polling all interested parties. We are one.

Do we agree to the release of these documents?


Walter Elder

Walter Elder
Assistant to the Director

Attachment:
ER 75/3958

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exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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
August 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Benjamin Evans
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Release of Material to Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence

Please inform us by close of business Wednesday, August 27, whether or not your agency has any objection to the release of the attached material, apparently originated by your agency, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.


for Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachments:

1. Memorandum dated 6/11/62 from [REDACTED] 25X1A
2. Report dated 12/8/61 titled "Elements of U.S. Strategy to Deal with Wars of National Liberation" and attached memos from Mr. Bissel to Mr. Bundy of 12/11/61 and Mr. Bundy to Mr. Bissel of 12/19/61
3. Report dated December, 1960 titled "Limited War, Part I"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

11 DEC 1961


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Report of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare
Task Force

1. For some months a task force of senior officers, under my chairmanship, has been discussing how best to ensure an adequate focus within the U. S. Government on the problems of dealing with Communist indirect aggression and subversive violence. The officers on this group have included officials of the State and Defense Departments, the White House, and CIA. They have, however, participated as individuals and have not committed their respective organizations.

2. The result of our effort, unanimously approved by the task force members, is herewith submitted for your consideration. I am also sending copies to General Maxwell Taylor for his comments in his capacity as chairman of the NSC Special Group, the charter of which would be enlarged by the report's recommendations. Copies of the report are also being sent to the State and Defense Departments through their task force participants.

3. I suggest that after soliciting the views of the agencies concerned you might well wish to take the initiative in submitting the report to the NSC for Presidential review of the action recommendations.


RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

25X1A

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12 DEC 1961

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December 19, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Richard M. Bissell

I write to acknowledge receipt of your report of the Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force. I have asked General Taylor to consider this report in the Special Group, since this group includes senior representatives of the departments concerned, and since the problem to which it is addressed is very near to the concerns of the Special Group. I have suggested to General Taylor that this may be an efficient way of concerting a recommendation to the National Security Council and the President.

The President has indicated to both General Taylor and to me strong concern for effective action in this area, and I know he would want me to express this preliminary appreciation for the work of your Task Force. You may wish to inform members of the Task Force of this action so that the large departments concerned may all know where the current focus of consideration is.

McGeorge Bundy

CC: General Taylor
Mr. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Gilpatrick
Mr. McCone
Mr. Fostow

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ELEMENTS OF US STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH
"WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"

Report Prepared By
Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force

8 December 1961

Copy No. 4

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CONCLUSIONS

1. Serious Communist intent and capability to press forward with the technique of subversive intervention, often extending to guerrilla warfare in various underdeveloped countries or regions, confront the US with a critical problem which will persist throughout the Sixties.

2. However, despite the clear consensus within the US Government as to the magnitude and urgency of this problem, we are not yet organized to help threatened countries to deal adequately with it. We have at our disposal a variety of potential resources and programs for facilitating the prevention of Communist subversive violence and for repressing active guerrillas, but these have not yet been harnessed by a unifying concept of operations, high level focus on the problem, and greater impetus to the development of programs commensurate to the need.

3. Such policies and programs cut across a wide spectrum of existing agency responsibilities. In particular, they will require concerted and carefully focussed civil and military actions by the State and Defense Departments, AID, USIA, and CIA.

4. But there is no single high-level locus of authority and responsibility within the Executive Branch to undertake this vitally needed concerting of inter-agency resources. There is no present coordinating mechanism, short of the NSC, which is empowered to provide the needed centralized direction of effort, and there is none which is devoting a significant share of its

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

energies to the peculiar requirements of the guerrilla warfare challenge and to its inter-agency program implications. Except for such country Task Forces as have been constituted in specific instances, there are no mechanisms for focussing Government-wide resources on identifying and finding solutions to the unique problems of particular countries. Moreover, present Task Forces for critical areas have lacked a source of guidance and support on the special problems of preventing and dealing with Communist subversive violence, and they have not always focussed sufficiently on these aspects.

5. Therefore, the most immediate need is for adequate institutional arrangements to ensure continuing focus on and attention to the problem at a high governmental level. Because of its responsibilities in directly related fields and because the agencies chiefly concerned are already represented on it, expansion of the mandate of the NSC Special Group seems the most effective way to carry out this function.

6. New arrangements are also needed to facilitate the stepping-up or reorientation of existing departmental and agency programs to achieve maximum effectiveness in those countries where the need is most critical, and to enable us to anticipate future needs. However, action responsibility for programs to prevent or counter subversive violence should continue to rest with the appropriate departments and agencies. Most of these programs also involve broader objectives. The preventive aspects of our diplomatic, economic aid, overt informational, and certain covert programs on behalf of

ii

S E C R E T

social, economic, and political progress in threatened countries are inevitably closely related to the totality of US foreign policy toward such countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly it is proposed that:

1. The NSC Special Group, chaired by the Military Representative of the President, should be given the additional responsibility of providing focus and direction to interdepartmental programs for coping with threats of Communist subversive intervention, actual and potential, in nations and areas abroad which the President considers critical. Where appropriate, the Directors of the Agency for International Development and the US Information Agency would be invited to participate in Special Group deliberations in this field.

2. As a first step, the Special Group should recommend a directive delimiting and defining the new scope of its responsibility, to include the designation of the specific areas where subversive violence or guerrilla warfare is either already a major factor (e.g., South Vietnam, Laos, Colombia) or a potentially serious threat (e.g., Thailand, Iran, Bolivia). The designation criteria should be rigorously narrow so as to focus attention and resources on only the few most critical situations.

3. For countries or regions determined by the NSC Special Group to be critically threatened by Communist subversive violence and approved by the President for assignment to its jurisdiction, the Secretary of State in coordination with the department heads should constitute inter-agency country

iii

S E C R E T

SECRET

or regional Task Forces in Washington (if not already in being), charged with the development and review of integrated action programs to deal with Communist violence or its threat in their geographic areas. The Task Forces would normally be chaired by senior State Department geographic officers at the Assistant Secretary level. If the endangered country is in an active US Military Theater of Operations or if the NSC Special Group determines that the military aspects of the country situation predominate, the Defense Department should assume the chairmanship. Members would be formally assigned and regard as primary their duties on the Task Force. Task Forces would report to and be under the guidance of the NSC Special Group on matters bearing directly on Communist-inspired violence.

4. In countries designated as critically threatened, the Country Teams should be charged with developing and forwarding integrated program recommendations and with ensuring effective local coordination in the execution of approved programs to counter the threat. The Country Teams would submit their recommendations and reports through normal channels to the chairmen of the competent Task Forces, who would keep the NSC Special Group informed of plans and progress.

5. The Special Group should also be responsible for focussing increased attention on those aspects of broader US Government programs which generate resources for the prevention or neutralization of Communist subversive intervention, e.g., Military Assistance Program (MAP), Overseas Internal Security

iv

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Program (OISP), certain specialized military forces and covert action programs. It should interest itself in the following types of problems, drawing on the informational resources and special skills of the various departments and agencies as appropriate:

a. The organization, equipment, funds, doctrine, and techniques required to improve the capabilities of designated threatened countries for internal security and counter-guerrilla measures. This may involve strengthening or initiating OISP activities, reorienting MAP activities to give increased emphasis to the counter-guerrilla training and equipping mission, or the provision of new authority, funds, facilities, personnel and equipment for CIA counter-guerrilla paramilitary operations.

b. Ways in which MAP and MAAG activities in threatened countries, possibly supplemented by AID and CIA capabilities, can help realize the constructive economic and political potentialities of civic action by the armed forces of the countries.

c. The adequacy of current appropriations, fiscal procedures, and enabling legislation to satisfy indicated program needs, with possible requests for new Congressional authority to permit inter-agency transfers of funds and achieve greater flexibility for counter-violence aid programs.

6. While action responsibility for programs related to preventing or countering subversive violence would remain in existing departments and agencies, it is appropriate that the Special Group be authorized to comment

v

S E C R E T

SECRET

or submit recommendations on the particular implications of such programs for the critical problems of deterring Communist subversions and violence, especially for the shorter-term purposes of winning local popular support away from the Communists. The Special Group would provide focus on counter-subversion implications of departmental critical area planning both through its collective guidance to the critical area Task Forces and through the instructions of individual Special Group members to their own area representatives through their respective departmental and agency channels. The Special Group would also review integrated critical area program proposals, prepared by the Task Forces in coordination with the senior US field representative, and would approve them for execution if they fall within existing policy. In the event of inter-agency disagreements, or actions requiring fresh policy determinations, the Special Group members would refer them to their respective principals.

7. Once a critical area inter-agency program had been approved, the Special Group would monitor its execution both through the appropriate Task Forces and through the departmental/agency channels of Special Group members. The main contribution of the Task Forces in the monitoring and review process would be in providing collective judgments, by country or region, on the adequacy of program objectives and achievements in relation to the problems of preventing or countering subversive violence.

8. In view of the sensitivity of covert action programs and the special

vi

SECRET

SECRET

procedures in effect for authorizing and reviewing them, covert aspects of counter-guerrilla warfare country and regional program planning and execution would be handled through special channels.

9. In considering action programs to counter Communist subversive intervention in designated critical areas, the Special Group and Task Forces should give attention to the possibilities for "offensive counter-measures", as discussed on pp. 33-43 of this report.

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. Purpose of the Report	1
II. Elements of the Problem	1
A. The Modernizing Process	1
B. Communist Doctrine and Tactics	3
III. Statement of U.S. Aims	9
IV. Recommended U.S. Strategy	15
A. General Observations	15
B. Inducing Needed Internal Reforms	17
1. Overt Programs	22
a. Diplomacy	22
b. Official AID Civil Economic Development and Technical Assistance Programs	23
c. Military Advisory and Assistance Programs	23
2. Covert Programs	26
C. Strengthening Capabilities for Internal Security and Military Defense	30
D. Offensive Countermeasures Across International Borders	33
V. Conclusions	44
VI. Recommendations	46

S E C R E T

I. Purpose of the Report

Leaving aside the recurrent problem of Berlin, the primary problem of American foreign policy for well over a decade has centered on the revolutionary process going forward in the underdeveloped areas. Directly and indirectly these areas have generated the major crises and anxieties of the non-Communist world.

This report analyses situations in the underdeveloped areas where subversive and guerrilla-type violence, inspired and exploited by the Communists, now exists or threatens in the immediate future. On the basis of this analysis elements of a US strategy are proposed for coping with threats of subversive violence, including "wars of national liberation."*

II. Elements of the Problem.A. The Modernizing Process

The revolutionary process in the underdeveloped areas has consisted in slow or more rapid transformation of the traditional societies toward modernization. The forces and attitudes set in being by this process have created systematic patterns of tension within the non-Communist world between its Northern and Southern halves; e.g., between Indo-China and France, Indonesia and the Netherlands, Egypt and Britain, Algeria and France, Congo

*Note: Krushchev used the term "wars of national liberation" in his 6 January 1961 address to CPSU theoreticians. In that address he promised full Communist support to such wars, which he described as "struggles by all colonies and dependent countries against international imperialism" and as "uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes."

and Belgium, Angola and Portugal, Cuba and United States. These difficulties have been heightened by the sober and systematic effort of the Communists to exploit this revolutionary process for their own purposes.

The underdeveloped and former colonial nations have been undergoing radical and fundamental change in their political, economic, and social structures. In many states the central governments have been weak and inexperienced. They lack the attitudes and administrative machinery to meet the problems of effective national unity, class discord, religious strife, tribal enmity, and economic growth. They have been distracted by real or imagined indignities from the past and deep compulsions to express themselves forcefully on the world scene, despite the inherent weakness of their domestic bases. Under these circumstances, it has been extremely difficult, if not impossible--except in a few marginal cases--to maintain at the same time the working concepts of free government, law and order, reasonably steady progress towards modernization, and a constructive stance on the world scene.

It is difficult to generalize about the characteristics of the modernizing process for several reasons. Historical and geographic circumstances make every case unique and, additionally, no two states are at the same point in the modernization process. Each has points of strength and vulnerability which arise according to the degree to which it has moved forward in political, social and economic modernization. The process of modernization is inherently interacting. A weak government, a situation of deeply unresolved

S E C R E T

class conflict, and a stagnant economy interact to produce degeneration. On the other hand, the whole process can be moved forward by constructive impulses from any direction. An additional variable is that the susceptibility to Communist pressure of states varies not merely with their vulnerability but with respect to their proximity to Communist borders and is influenced by current Communist strategy.

The only constant that applies in all cases where a state is being subjected to subversive violence is that the Communists, in order to achieve their victory, use an inherently destructive approach to weaken and eliminate or take over existing military and official institutions. We, in contrast, in aiding the threatened nation must seek to buttress and improve these same institutions. Since it is easier to throw rocks than to fend them off, the Communists' task is relatively the more simple, and the non-Communist world has the tougher job in building and fighting to protect what is being built. Where a nation is new and ill-prepared to meet the responsibilities of sovereignty, most essential national institutions are inadequate or virtually non-existent, as in the Congo. Such states are very near the condition of chaos where a relatively small number of Communist leaders can readily gain control.

B. Communist Doctrine and Tactics

There is little mystery about the basic strategy and philosophy of successful Communist leaders in the underdeveloped areas. They have been prolific writers and speakers, with a Hitler-like compulsion to state their

S E C R E T

objectives and explain their methods with candor. Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara are now widely read in both the Communist and free worlds. On the other hand, in the heat of their battles for power the Communists are remarkably opportunistic and their "blueprints of aggression" have proved of little value in forecasting specific tactics in a particular situation. Their long-term aims of achieving and consolidating Communist power have however remained consistent.

The Communists, working from a closed and virtually amoral society, have a relative advantage over the nations of the Free World in mounting offensives of subversive violence. The Communist structure is designed to permit a minority to control a majority assumed to be dissident; and normal Communist domestic control measures reduce their relative vulnerability to externally stimulated acts of subversion. Put another way, the fundamental social, political and human objectives of non-Communist societies render them more vulnerable than Communist societies to induced subversive activities. This is an initial disadvantage we must accept and with whose consequences we must cope.

The world has yet to see an independent state permanently elect to go Communist. There have been "palace revolutions" which the Communists have subsequently sought to exploit. There are also a number of so-called neutral states now leaning toward the Communist bloc, but, as of today, it appears that the Communists' most promising opportunity to expand into the

S E C R E T

Free World lies in subversive violence and guerrilla opposition to governments which are not adequately meeting the political, social, economic, and security requirements of their peoples.

So long as serious tensions exist within a threatened community, the Communists can hope to develop them into serious vulnerabilities, which if adroitly exploited, may arrest the state's forward movement and push it back toward confusion. Serious political, social and economic tension can frequently be created and maintained from outside of the target state. Economic pressure and intensive propaganda are two obvious means to this end. In regions where cities are few and far between and the economy is still essentially agricultural, where the central government has not gripped and led the peasantry, a passive, detached rural population, capable of being terrorized or enflamed, is the more important and rewarding target for Communist political activity. We have seen this situation in South Viet-Nam. Discontented urban populations may be the most fertile ground for Communist activity if the country is in the uneasy throes of early industrialization. Egypt is an example here.

A nation's educated and professional manpower constitute another element of varying strength and vulnerability. The Congo today has urgent and desperate need for citizens with legal training who can set up at least a rudimentary judicial structure. A few such men oriented toward the Free World would directly influence the society and future politics of the country. On the other hand, the Communist Party in Greece in the late Thirties and

S E C R E T

throughout the Forties drew a considerable proportion of its leadership from unemployed and resentful lawyers, for that profession had been a fashionable and socially desirable one for ambitious young men, and the country's government and economy simply could not absorb them.

One of the Communists' most effective political warfare achievements in the years since World War II has been to persuade many millions in the underdeveloped countries and a disappointing number of national leaders that our policy of preserving existing international patterns and assisting existing governments reflects a desire on our part to freeze and preserve inadequate standards and modes of life in many of the non-Communist states of the world. The assumption that we oppose change and would prefer to see traditional inequities preserved imposes a serious handicap on our foreign relations.

In underdeveloped areas where the Communists are able to exploit various local tensions and engage in active guerrilla operations, such operations can in themselves further Communist aims in a number of ways:

1. A guerrilla opposing even a moderately unpopular regime has a strong psychological appeal to a part of the populace because he is expressing in action emotions which they already feel and with which they sympathize. For a government with democratic pretensions or inadequate police or military power, suppression of guerrillas who enjoy marginal support is a subtle and demanding political problem. Guerrillas logically strike at the economy and the basic social institutions of a country in order

to weaken the government, but they are usually less in evidence than the numerically superior government forces who swarm across the countryside trying to catch them. Hence, the populace tends to blame the government not only for any reprisal measures, but for their burned homes, looted farm yards and lost occupations, without thinking back to first causes. The government's unpopularity tends to increase if its performance does not guarantee security.

2. For the Communists, a well-disciplined guerrilla force is also the core of an effective administrative instrument and differs mainly in poorer uniforms and living conditions from the elite police and party officials who will manage matters if they achieve their victory. The ability of a close-knit guerrilla unit to carry out assassinations as desired and impose a suitable sense of terror and submission on any popular opposition to them, fits neatly into the Communist theory that a small group should direct and discipline the great mass of the people. Guerrilla war, as the Communists wage it, enables them to combine in one well-controlled figure a potential popular hero and an efficient secret policeman.

3. The Communists have discovered, as many have before them, that in suitable terrain the partisan fighter occupies the full and expensive attention of five to fifteen conventional soldiers and that, without actually controlling provinces or regions, he can deny their economic

and political support to the government.

4. The Communists have refined subversive violence as an instrument of political warfare to apply it destructively to underdeveloped countries in almost all stages of early growth. The inflaming of tribal rivalries and religious hatreds, the disruption of amateurish but well-intentioned efforts at local administration, and the murder of potential anti-Communist leaders can prevent the working of even the most primitive government systems. If a government builds security forces to protect its administrative efforts and to establish at least a semblance of law and order, these in turn become Communist targets to be destroyed or at least evicted from the more critical areas. If existing social institutions become identified with the government and show signs of vitality and strength, the Communists' efforts are devoted to undermining, taking over or demolishing these bodies. For all those tasks varying sized groups of armed irregulars drawn from disaffected elements of the population can be highly effective. They can work from a base of general dissatisfaction with things as they are to create the popular sense of confusion, fear, and, finally, resignation which the Communists require. By terrorizing the peasants and defying the central government, the Communists can posture as the wave of the future.

5. The Communists are aware that subversive groups and guerrilla units not actively supported by the population cannot long survive unless

SECRET

adequately supported from outside sources. Where such support is provided, a contest between a guerrilla force and a shaky government becomes in effect a contest between the powers which are backing each of them.

III. Statement of U. S. Aims

American policy for the underdeveloped areas must somehow reconcile the sometimes conflicting objectives of achieving reasonably steady progress toward modernization, maintaining law and order, fostering the working concept of free government, and encouraging the underdeveloped country to adopt a constructive foreign policy stance on the world scene in relation to the East-West struggle.

If these objectives are to be achieved, the pressures of subversive violence must be stopped or at least reduced to manageable proportions. The governments, as they face these burdens, must simultaneously be enabled and persuaded to undertake needed social and economic programs and reforms which will make possible a higher degree of loyalty to nationhood, social accommodation, and economic progress. There is no firmer lesson in modern American experience--from the turn of the century experience in the Philippines, through wartime Nationalist China, down to Diem--than this: reform cannot safely wait until the guerrillas are suppressed.

The principal US task is to locate, encourage and nurture those elements of national leadership--political, military and social--which show ability to guide and administer the unsettled community and thus to create a measure of

SECRET

stability and forward momentum. In cases where the threatened nation has a somewhat more mature and better developed institutional base, the task of selecting and encouraging the elements of potential power is substantially simpler. On the other hand, these nodes of power are equally obvious to the Communists and will, in consequence, be subjected to a more concentrated attack. The further along the hard road to political maturity a nation has travelled the more flexible the program of assistance can be, for there are more and stronger foundations on which to build.

At the same time the planning and administration of assistance become more complex, and the possibilities of imbalance within the growing structure increase, bringing new dangers of serious instability; e.g., in Iran. Therefore, an initial problem to be solved in coping with Communist inspired subversive violence is to determine where the points of power and vulnerability lie at the time in the nation under attack. Once this is done we can determine how to strengthen those elements which most effectively support our objectives and how best to ease the tensions which have created the dangerous vulnerabilities.

We require a doctrine which begins with a recognition of the revolutionary situation we confront as clear-eyed as that of the Communists. And we require, as well, an equally lucid definition of the US objective.

The American commitment of policy and of faith is roughly this: We are dedicated to the proposition that the revolutionary process of modernization shall be permitted to go forward in independence, with increasing degrees of human

freedom. We seek two results: first, that truly independent nations shall emerge on the world scene; and, second, that each nation will be permitted to fashion, out of its own culture and its own ambitions, the kind of modern society it wants. The same religious and philosophical beliefs which decree that we respect the uniqueness of each individual, make it natural that we respect the uniqueness of each national society.

Moreover, we are confident--or we are prepared to gamble--that, if the independence of this process can be maintained over the coming years and decades, these societies will choose their own version of what we would recognize as a progressively representative and open society. We are also prepared to gamble that the resulting societies will recognize the advantages of economic and other forms of international cooperation with like-minded nations elsewhere.

In the past there has been considerable and costly ambiguity about the American objective. We have often assisted and subsidized governments in states peripheral to the Communist bloc on the simple, but static grounds that our own national security required that they resist Communist military pressure. This cast of mind--on both sides of the bargain--slowed the modernization process and left our partners vulnerable to other forms of Communist pressure.

Moreover, we have vacillated over the years between a reluctance to intervene too directly in the internal management of these states and an increasing

S E C R E T

sense of alarm at the inadequate political, military, and administrative steps that their governments have made to handle effectively their mounting problems. We have no clear doctrine as to how our means of access and influence should be applied.

In some instances our own representatives in the area have not perceived clearly enough or early enough the opportunities and dangers in the developing situation and, in consequence, our aid and advice has been ill-timed or ill-chosen.

In addition, our government's freedom of action has been occasionally impeded by the more adamant sections of American political opinion which hold that any avowed pro-American is better able to meet the particular problems of his own country than a more independent leader with perhaps dubious socialist tendencies.

Thus, we have seen conditions worsen in states where the leaders claim us as brothers but reject our advice, and, if more progressive, popular or forceful regimes replace them, it is all too easy for our enemies to make the change appear as a diplomatic defeat for the U. S.

Against this background we now are attempting to shore-up the strength of governments which face internal or foreign supported insurrections, and, at the same time, we are using varying forms of influence to persuade them to undertake or speed up overdue measures of internal reform.

This persuasion is a complex and frequently subtle business, for it must

S E C R E T

SECRET

rest on a current diagnosis of the strengths and weak points of the state which may be wholly at variance with the views of the government leaders. A natural reluctance to acknowledge their own failures, a distorted view of their own capabilities based on a long continued self-deception, and a gross misunderstanding of their assailants' strategy and tactics lead these leaders to disregard advice of foreigners who, they feel, do not truly understand their country; or, at best, it may lead them to postpone or to dilute changes that must be radical and prompt to be effective.

Moreover, there are often real conflicts between the short-run interests of a friendly regime and the imperatives of effective modernization. Reforms per se mean a denial of previous privilege. Since the privileged usually possess the power to promote or temporarily to prevent change, their carrying through of reforms must result either from enlightened self-interest or desperation. Where leaders can be persuaded to make timely and adequate moves toward gaining popular support, there is real hope for political viability. Too often governments delay until a real crisis is upon them, and their alternatives are narrowed.

Various forms of rebellion against such governments are now widespread, and the effectiveness of insurrection and guerrilla warfare against a shaky and unpopular regime has been repeatedly proven. Where a government has lost its basis of popular support, control of such an insurrection requires police-state measures. If the rebels receive substantial outside support and

SECRET

S E C R E T

encouragement, the government's task is further compounded.

The problem today is to establish and preserve the basis for progressive political modernization, under regimes which effectively maintain their national independence, in the regions threatened by Communist aggression below the threshold of limited war. We must find ways to make the non-Communist governments not only militarily effective against their domestic enemy but politically attractive to a working majority of their people, and we must do this in the face of a far too widely held belief that we stand against the forces seeking change and progress.

If we are to move effectively against the threat of Communist subversive violence against the weaker nations, we must see that our varied capabilities--civil and military--are directed toward practical and realizable goals, in particular cases; and the civil and military arms must be orchestrated with a full sensitivity to the interacting character of the problem. In the face of this problem there is rarely a pure military or a pure civil action. Although each case will be unique, it may be useful to fix on a rationale for such actions which will make vigorous US counter-measures both feasible and acceptable to world opinion.

While it is desirable to gain the support of world opinion wherever possible, the final determinant should, however, be the effectiveness of the proposed actions in furthering essential US interests.

Wherever possible, we should increase the effectiveness of our own

S E C R E T

SECRET

resources by employing them in concert with those of members of international organizations, such as the United Nations. We must, however, be prepared to act bilaterally, or possibly unilaterally, in the event that we cannot readily achieve a multilateral or bilateral consensus. Again, getting the job done in time to be successful should be our main concern.

IV. Recommended US Strategy

A. General Observations

As discussed above, US programs to counter or preferably prevent Communist subversive violence in underdeveloped areas must at the same time bring about necessary internal reforms and repress the Communist apparatus and its subversive activities. Where Communist subversion in a country is being given direct material and human support from an adjacent controlled area, it will also be necessary to consider defensive counter-measures to make such third country support difficult or unprofitable for the Communists.

These three program areas are interrelated, as are the feasible measures that can be taken to further them. The blend of program activities will depend on the assessed requirements of specific country situations.

Such requirements should take account of: (a) the magnitude or imminence of the current Communist subversive threat; (b) the ability and willingness of the Communists to furnish direct material, human, financial and other support from adjacent or nearby third countries; (c) the competence of the local government and its willingness to undertake self-help and reform.

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measures as prerequisites to multilateral or US developmental aid; (d) the size and efficiency of the country's military and internal security forces; (e) the country's attainments in its modernizing process, including the literacy and technical skills of its population, the competence of its civil service and governmental social and economic institutions, and the degree to which its economic resources have been developed; and (f) the homogeneity of the population and their loyalty to the existing regime.

In view of the urgency of the remedial program tasks wherever Communist subversive violence is present or imminently threatens, all available program resources must be imaginatively and skillfully employed to achieve a maximum constructive impact. In the economic and institutional area, it may be possible to supplement official and unilateral overt US economic development and technical assistance aid by development loans and technical assistance missions from international organizations. In the military and internal security fields, however, it is probable that the main burden will fall on the US. Where the underdeveloped country is allied with or friendly to the US, military and security assistance may be furnished overtly under bilateral aid agreements. Where Communist insurgents are being actively supported from an adjacent third country base, due attention must be given to the dangers of escalation in determining the kind and level of overt US military assistance.

Attainment of timely and effective results is, however, the main program determinant in both the civil and military fields. Covert action measures

should therefore be employed to supplement and reinforce feasible overt programs wherever the overt efforts appear unlikely to succeed by themselves. As discussed below, covert measures may either be carried out bilaterally with the host government or be unilateral US efforts. Bilateral covert measures with the local government may be indicated to enhance the effectiveness of overt programs and to carry out activities whose impact would be impaired, or which might invite escalation, were the US role generally known. Unilateral US covert action may be required to bring pressure to bear on the local government, its instrumentalities, or on private organizations and institutions to help overcome reluctance to adopt needed constructive change.

B. Inducing Needed Internal Reforms

In view of the reluctance of many of the governments and oligarchies of threatened countries in underdeveloped areas to initiate reforms and help satisfy the rising expectations of the population, we will have to devise more effective means of combining overt civil and military with covert instruments to influence governmental and other leaders to take the steps necessary for their country's preservation and its progressive modernization. Our active participation in the affairs of governments threatened by Communist subversive violence will be effective in preventing their downfall only if we can directly influence the policies of their leaders. Our programs in such states as Laos and South Vietnam have involved our prestige directly and deeply, but have given us-- up to the present at least--insufficient leverage to influence the course of

SECRET

events decisively.

This is particularly important and unfortunate in situations such as exist in Iran and in many South American countries where economic, social, and political frustration of groups growing in strength encourages subversive moods capable of hostile external exploitation. In cases like these the American willingness and ability to enforce and assist in some tough structural changes in the existing order are the first condition for protecting the threatened country's national interest.

In our desire to assure smooth short-run relations with transitional oligarchies, we often tend to forget that they have no rational alternative to going along with our recommendations, particularly if we insist on specific reforms as prerequisites to our continuing to provide them with aid. We must recognize, however, the deepseated emotional, cultural, and proprietary resistance to any change that would lessen present powers and privileges, regardless of how unrealistic and short-sighted this stubbornness may seem when objectively viewed. Hence, we must exert greater influence than in the past through more concerted orchestrated use of the diplomatic, military, and covert instruments available to us. Only thus can we speed up our friends' progress toward ending social injustices and establishing political and economic patterns which can survive in the contemporary world.

In this process, hard-nosed realism may be more important than diplomatic niceties. In leaning forward with the currents of history we must

SECRET

S E C R E T

be increasingly prepared to risk the displeasure of governments currently holding power.

In bringing the needed greater influence to bear on the governments and institutions of friendly underdeveloped areas, we have at our disposal a varied array of overt as well as covert resources. The challenge is to use them imaginatively and effectively.

Before considering individual program capabilities, it is desirable to note that vitalization of a country's political life and processes is quite as important as introduction of the economic and social reforms essential to meaningful modernization. Reform and enforcement of tax collection on the basis of ability to pay, changes in land tenure and labor relationships, more effective fiscal and monetary management, and introduction of the concept of human liberty under law may have little positive impact on popular attitudes and loyalties if the people still regard the central government as a remote and unapproachable alien institution not responsive to their ideas and grievances. This sense of distance and frustration will be increased if the electoral system is obviously rigged and if there are insufficient channels of open communication between the government and the governed.

In many transitional societies, social and educational conditions are insufficiently advanced to recommend broadly-based political democracy, but it is important that the mass of the population regard the central government as a benevolent friend responsive to their needs and aspirations. There

S E C R E T

should also be room for diversity of opinion, a healthy non-Communist political opposition if possible, or at least channels for protest and means for redressing grievances.

The post-war experience in the Philippines illustrates some political and organizational devices that can play a highly constructive role in winning the grass-roots popular support so necessary for frustrating a subversive guerrilla movement. Following the 1949 presidential election, which was widely regarded as dishonest, the Communist-influenced Huk guerrillas argued that the only way the government could really be changed was by popular force. By 1951, the Huks had a guerrilla strength of 15,000 and a mass base of about a million supporters and sympathizers, mostly tenant farmers on Luzon.

Under Magsaysay's leadership, the Philippine Army undertook to win back popular support from the guerrillas by holding a new and demonstrably free and honest election and by inaugurating new administrative and organizational procedures to demonstrate the new Government's concern for the popular welfare. The elections were held with secret balloting and freedom of expression and movement for candidates of all parties. The results were accepted as valid because a number of administration opponents were elected, and the people came to feel that the new government was their own, to be supported against the armed rebellion seeking to overthrow it. By 1953, the Huk guerrillas were reduced from 15,000 to 300. Only 34,000 Filipino troops were employed in military operations against the Huks (as contrasted with the

200,000 South Vietnamese troops engaged against 20-40,000 Viet Cong guerrillas, and the 150,000 Greek troops that were employed against 25,000 Greek guerrillas).

Magsaysay reinforced his military and national electoral efforts with an administrative innovation whereby any citizen who felt he had a legitimate grievance against the central government, its local provincial officials, or the military was encouraged to wire the details, at a very nominal cost, to the Philippine War Department. All such complaints were investigated without delay and acted on as the facts indicated.

Magsaysay also initiated a program of community development in the outlying areas to stimulate local initiative, assisted by the central government, to find cooperative solutions to community social and economic problems. This supplemented and reinforced central government land redistribution programs and other social and economic reforms. Magsaysay also insisted that the Army seek to identify itself with the interests of the peasants and use its resources to further social and economic development wherever possible. These measures were communicated to the people by an effective and imaginative information program.

The Philippine precedent shows what can be accomplished by an enlightened, energetic, and imaginative central government to win the allegiance of the popular base from the Communists and thus to destroy the foundations of Communist guerrilla action. It is a pattern which should be

S E C R E T

implanted, with whatever local modifications are necessary, wherever possible in other underdeveloped areas now facing the reality or threat of subversive Communist violence.

1. Overt Programs

The Magsaysay program in the Philippines actually involved both 25X1C

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guidance and assistance. The program was, however, made possible because of the personal attitudes and characteristics of Magsaysay, who combined the qualities of a natural popular leader with strong anti-Communist and pro-US convictions and openmindedness toward political innovation and social and economic reforms. In other underdeveloped or transitional countries under the threat of Communist subversive violence where the chief of state or prime minister has similar attitudes and characteristics, it should be possible for us to employ our overt foreign affairs program resources to good effect in fostering and supporting a Magsaysay-type program:

a. Diplomacy. Even in its narrow sense as the formal government-to-government relations between sovereign states through their diplomatic establishments, diplomacy can set the tone of inter-governmental collaboration and facilitate the various forms of co-operative association that may be undertaken. It is of great importance in countries with transitional problems that our principal

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

diplomatic representatives be able to establish and maintain sympathetic personal rapport with the chief of state and principal leaders of the country. This rapport should be grounded on a deep understanding of the country's problems and traditions, but it should not be attained at the expense of realistic objectivity toward the current historical processes impinging on the society as a whole. If there is sufficient mutual personal respect, our diplomatic representatives should be able to speak bluntly and persuasively about reform needs and to sell constructive proposals on the Magsaysay pattern.

b. Official AID Civil Economic Development and Technical Assistance Programs. Well-conceived civil economic and technical assistance country programs, staffed by qualified and effective American personnel, should be able not only to advance agreed bilateral project aims, but also to influence the receptivity of the middle and lower governmental functionaries to institutional and policy changes. As AID officers will be functioning in part among the population at large, the image they present and the ideas they express can help induce a popular climate of support for constructive innovation. This is the more likely to the extent that they can help stimulate and channelize local popular initiatives into self-help community projects and induce a sense of local responsibility.

c. Military Advisory and Assistance Programs. In addition

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

to their more conventional role in strengthening a friendly foreign country's armed forces for defensive military and counter-guerrilla operations and as deterrent force, our Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (MAAGs) abroad have the opportunity to indoctrinate and guide the local military forces to assume a constructive civic role in the modernization of their country. Perhaps because of our different Western history and educational tradition, we tend to forget that a properly trained and utilized military arm can be extremely helpful in advancing the national unity, educational level, and economic development of underdeveloped states where such attainments have not existed.

In the course of their training soldiers can become literate and can achieve an understanding of national unity, self-discipline, and obligation to serve the public welfare which the general populations often lack. They can learn many technical trades and crafts which will materially increase their value as citizens of the developing nation when their military terms expire. In short, the armed forces can often serve as stop-gap but effective primary and secondary school systems while increasing their military effectiveness.

The military services' own need for improved communications, transportation lines, and general construction is but a part of their country's more general need for the same facilities. In

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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addition to satisfying purely military needs, the local armed services can be effectively employed, if there is forethought and planning, to construct needed civil roads, telephone lines, and airfields which would serve the general population in time of peace and increase the defensive military capability in the event of civil disturbances or external aggression. Much as done in the US by our own Army Engineers, the local armed services can also help improve the lot of the farmers and the general population through flood-control, crop-spraying, irrigation, and reclamation projects.

A conscious program of troop indoctrination and military-civil relations projects can also reinforce the material civil contributions of the armed forces by increasing the sense of identification between the outlying civil population and the country's national governmental impetus toward economic and social advancement and national solidarity as personified by the armed forces. As the members of the armed forces will probably be drawn from all parts of the country, a military-civil relations program, including social and hospitality activities, can help break down inter-tribal and inter-regional prejudices and increase popular loyalty to the nation and its government.

A broad approach by the military toward meeting civil requirements will directly assist in easing the tensions and strains of

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S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100040002-3

S E C R E T

early national growth and bring the army of the central government and the people into a new and more constructive relationship. The constructive potential of the local military is thus one of the greatest unexploited assets of the non-Communist world. This is in striking contrast with the pattern that has too often prevailed where senior military officers in underdeveloped states have grossly misused their power and their relatively advanced educational backgrounds to warp and retard civil government.

Achievement of a constructive military-civil relationship will not only substantially further modernization and lessen the popular civil vulnerability to subversive Communist appeals, but also greatly strengthen the capabilities of the military forces in actively combatting Communist-inspired subversive violence and guerrilla warfare; deprived of logistical, recruiting, and intelligence support from the countryside, the guerrillas will be forced on the defensive.

An imaginative and broad-gauge MAAG program along these lines can assuredly pay big dividends if the local government is at all responsive to such ideas.

2. Covert Programs

As previously noted, a general problem in threatened underdeveloped countries is that of developing and strengthening the basic

S E C R E T

governmental and social institutions that are prerequisites to modernization. In some cases, as in the Congo, the local leadership is responsive to the need for change but lacks the background and competence to take needed steps on its own initiative. In other cases, a frustrating and exasperating problem in countries severely threatened by Communist political and military subversion and plagued by outmoded political, economic, and social systems is the reluctance--bordering on blind obstinacy--of the governmental leaders to admit the need for reform or to take effective initiatives to this end.

In both cases, the traditional and internationally accepted tools of government-to-government diplomacy and bilateral or multilateral economic, public administration, and military aid programs--dependent as they are on acceptance by the local government, or in the Congo by international opinion--are unlikely by themselves to provide the guidance or to achieve the reforms essential to winning broadly-based popular support for the national regime and thus undercutting the basis for Communist strength and influence. In such situations, the broad range of covert action measures available to us offers our best and only chance of increasing our leverage and achieving needed changes in time to frustrate Communist ambitions, short of an open and costly military confrontation.

In the first instance, the problem is to demonstrate to the population at large that there is a constructive impetus for progress alternative

to the Communist prescription for solving their problems and meeting their aspirations. To these ends, supplementing official US governmental efforts, there is the need to strengthen the influence and effectiveness of those elements of the government, the political parties, social institutions, and public information media that favor non-Communist development and reforms. It is often the case that the personalities, groups, and information media that favor such ideas and have a potentially wide popular appeal lack both the resources and the know-how to compete effectively with either the subsidized instrumentalities of the regime or the well-financed and centrally-directed agitators and fronts of the Communists.

It would clearly be contrary to US diplomatic tradition and accepted international practices for a US Mission openly or attributably to subsidize and advise elements of the incumbent government not fully in sympathy with local policies, or likewise to assist parties and influential persons in active opposition outside the government. The open identification of such persons and groups with the US would also materially lessen their appeal and persuasiveness. Experience has amply shown, however, that through suitable covert operational methodology it is possible with minimal risk significantly to increase the effectiveness of such leaders, political parties, institutional groups, and information media, either to strengthen governmental institutions or to induce changes in governmental policies. This may involve the use as funding and guidance

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Through such covert measures, it is possible to vitalize organized and broadly-based political pressures on and within the reluctant local government. It is also possible, by strengthening the non-Communist voices and their organizational tactics in such institutional groups, to wrest Communist control from the local labor movement, peasants' associations, and youth and student organizations. Equally important, such measures can demonstrate to the people that there is active concern about their and their country's problems and that it is not only the Communists who favor progress and are prepared to do something about it. This essentially psychological effect may be almost as important in destroying the mass base for Communist subversive violence as tangible social and economic advances, though these must not be too long delayed.

Covert or non-attributable programs may also be used to good effect in direct bilateral cooperation with the local chief of state and a few other top officials. This presupposes areas of inter-governmental

SECRET

agreement for such activities. While such bilateral covert programs, where the US hand is concealed from unauthorized outside observers, are most likely to fall in the areas of [REDACTED]e, they 25X1C may also be employed to assist the local government in its own covert political and propaganda activities to counter Communist influences and to win popular understanding and support for constructive government social and economic programs.

G. Strengthening Capabilities for Internal Security and Military Defense

Whatever their social and economic philosophies, the heads of most underdeveloped states under the threat of Communist subversive violence are eager to accept US aid in strengthening their armed forces and their capabilities for stamping out Communist subversion. Our programs in these areas, particularly AID's Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), will normally be essentially overt, although the operational security implications of counter-intelligence and counter-espionage investigations and operations will limit public knowledge of the US role in this area. This also applies to certain aspects of counter-guerrilla training and techniques. It may also prove necessary to draw on the skills of American personnel whose status (with CIA or other agencies) recommends close control of their identification. But the sum of such US aid is essentially overt in that the general fact of official American participation will not be denied, although some details may be suppressed.

The most thorny policy problem for US military advisers in many underdeveloped countries is to convince the chief of state that his armed forces should be organized, trained, and equipped to deal with the peculiar requirements of guerrilla warfare and subversion, rather than as a vehicle for national prestige. In the nature of modern conventional warfare and the strength and quality of conventional forces at the disposal of the Communist Bloc states, it is not to be expected that the relatively limited forces of an underdeveloped country could achieve an independent capability for resisting open external Communist aggression. In countries like Iran, however, the chiefs of state often view their armed forces as reflections of their own authority and prestige, and they divert funds from sorely needed internal development and reform projects for a military establishment which neither provides true security against external threats nor is suited for meeting concerted internal subversion or guerrilla actions.

Experience in current and earlier campaigns against Communist guerrilla forces in Laos, South Vietnam, Indo-China, China, Greece, Malaya, etc., has shown that a relatively small guerrilla force can immobilize and in some cases defeat a vastly larger conventional force if the guerrillas have popular civil support in their areas and can maintain the tactical initiative. Even where the rural population is basically anti-Communist and loyal to the central government, Communist terror tactics can coerce their involuntary support.

Communist guerrilla insurgents can be defeated within acceptable cost only by tailoring the counter-guerrilla forces to employ guerrilla-type tactics and to keep the Communist guerrillas under unrelenting pressure. A static area defense system whereby government forces attempt to seal off the guerrilla's supply routes and simultaneously defend all strategic installations and communications lines that the guerrillas may attack leads to a dispersion of forces and leaves the tactical initiative to the guerrillas. The answer is not a larger defense force, whether local or augmented by US or Allied troops, but a different system of organization and tactics.

Part of the answer lies in creating specially-trained and highly mobile counter-guerrilla units of the police and the uniformed conventional military forces. Such units should be prepared for deployment by parachute or helicopter; should be skilled in jungle and mountain warfare, ranger tactics, and night patrolling; and should make full use of aerial reconnaissance and air tactical and logistical support.

This is unlikely to be sufficient of itself, however, as long as the Communist guerrillas can fade into the countryside and can be sheltered, fed, and provided intelligence by their sympathizers among the civil population. The problems of winning the basic loyalties of the civil population from the Communists have been adequately explored above, but there remains the need for being as ingenious, unconventional, and ruthless as the guerrillas in organizing intelligence networks, effecting agent penetrations

of the guerrilla bands, and employing fair means and foul for locating and destroying the guerrilla units and their members.

The selling of this kind of counter-guerrilla doctrine to the threatened countries' military leaders and helping them put it into effect are the main strictly military tasks for our MAAGs and their associates in actively counter-ing Communist guerrilla warfare within threatened countries. AID's OISP activities are equally important in strengthening the capabilities of the civil police for detecting and preventing or repressing other forms of Communist subversive violence.

D. Offensive Countermeasures Across International Borders

In reviewing the problems, resources, and kinds of action available to us to negate the threat Communist subversive violence in underdeveloped countries, we have hitherto dealt only with programs that affect the causes and manifestations of such violence in the threatened countries themselves. As previously noted, however, the Communist ability to mount and support subversive violence often depends on their control of an adjacent country which serves as a base of operations, a source of logistical and guerrilla troop replacement support, and a safe-haven for guerrilla forces if the pressure on them becomes too great at the scene of operations in the threatened country. Unless some feasible and acceptable means can be found to retaliate against the Communist-controlled third country from which subversive violence in a threatened non-Communist country is being mounted,

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S E C R E T

we are faced with the patently unjust situation that the physical destruction and human misery stemming from actions to counter the Communist threat will be limited to the soil of the victim. The situation also places us in the militarily and tactically disadvantageous position of being unable to destroy or neutralize the enemy's base and source of strength.

We have generally felt deterred, however, in situations short of declared and formal hostilities between sovereign states, from carrying the military conflict onto the territory of the third country. This, of course, plays into the Communist pretense that violent upheavals in a threatened country are of strictly indigenous origin. Our reluctance to take offensive countermeasures, except for occasional limited and non-attributable covert operations, has stemmed in part from concern lest an escalation and widening of the conflict result, and in part from strictures imposed by US adherence to the doctrine of non-intervention.

The United States (and virtually all other nations) has always historically supported the doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. It has occasionally been suggested that our vigorous, and often self-righteous, public support of this doctrine inhibits us in efforts to counter Communist subversion and Communist use of violence, especially in the underdeveloped nations, and that we should therefore consider some modification of the doctrine.

The counter argument seems, however, not only to have more

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

support within the US Government but also to have greater validity. It is to the effect that the doctrine of non-intervention, even though universally flouted by the Communists, nevertheless is more valuable to us than to them. The reasoning is that although the open societies of the West are less successful than the Communist societies in practicing covert intervention while publicly adhering to a doctrine of non-intervention, nevertheless the public doctrine does exercise considerable restraint on the Communists. Since it is alleged that the Communists, if unrestrained, would have a vastly greater capability of violent intervention than the West, the conclusion is that the West can well afford to accept a greater restraint on the use of its lesser capability in order to maintain a greater degree of restraint on the Communists' very much greater capability.

This appears to be the reasoning behind what might be described as the cold-blooded case for continuing publicly to uphold the doctrine of non-intervention. A more powerful pragmatic case is simply that this doctrine has acquired such wide respectability and appeal that the US could not propose publicly to modify or weaken it without paying an unacceptably heavy price. Accordingly, it is probably not worthwhile to debate whether if we threw off some of the restraints we could not develop a capability fully equal to that of the Communists. Realistically, our public commitment to the doctrine of non-intervention has to be accepted as a fact of life.

Taking this as a starting point, however, an ingenious application

S E C R E T

SECRET

and extension of the doctrine is proposed. It can be expressed in the following propositions:

1. Since all nations accept the doctrine of non-intervention, the US is going to treat the activities of any nation which incites and supports violence within another nation as a form of aggression morally equivalent to the military crossing of a border.

2. When a situation arises in which this subversive form of aggression is threatened or is being practiced, the US will generally favor the use of international control machinery to halt it, provided such machinery can be made to operate with full effectiveness.

3. If, however, in the face of clear evidence that violence is being supported across an international border, the establishment of international machinery to curb this type of aggression is opposed, or the machinery is ineffective, the US reserves the right to employ force (or to support the employment of force) up to at least the same scope and level in defense of the threatened nation.

4. Any such unilateral use of force by the US, or with US support, will be strategically a defensive action. That is to say, its purpose will be to induce a cessation of the subversive aggression to which it is a response.

5. Nevertheless, in taking such action the US will not deny itself (or its friends) the advantage of the tactical offensive, nor will

SECRET

it limit itself to weapons of the enemy's choosing. Specifically, it will feel free to incite and support violence within the aggressor's territory and to use weapons in which it has an advantage, but will endeavor to avoid major escalation of the scale of violence or sophistication of weapons.

In the above form, this doctrine is proposed both as a policy to guide the US response to situations of violence and as a rationale which would underlie the public posture of the US. As a rationale this amounts to an assertion that the US (a) takes the doctrine of non-intervention so seriously that it is going to treat violent intervention as the equivalent of overt aggression, and (b) recognizes the right of any country which is the victim of subversive violence to practice subversive violence in its own defense. It may well be asked whether this is not a justification for a declaration of war by the victim of subversion against the aggressor. It could of course, be just that. But the essence of the doctrine is that, because subversive violence involves the use of force for purposes of aggression but on a scale considerably less than that typical of a declared war, it is necessary to recognize the right of the victim to use force on a similarly limited scale in its own defense. It could well be argued that unless either this remedy of the unilateral limited use of force or the preferred remedy of effective international policing is available, then the doctrine of non-intervention operates one-sidedly to benefit the nation that undertakes violent subversion. In a situation like that existing between Communist

Northern Vietnam and South Vietnam, it would be difficult to justify to what is called "world opinion" a declaration of war by South Vietnam as a response to the guerrilla activity of the Viet Cong within its own borders. A declared war would indeed involve a major escalation of the scale of violence as well as serious danger of a widening of the conflict. Under these circumstances, a persuasive case could be made to the effect that the doctrine of nonintervention should not deny South Vietnam a remedy against this form of aggression.

As an operational policy, this doctrine has important implications for US action in situations of the type to which it is intended to apply:

1. First, it puts a premium on acquiring persuasive proof that subversive violence is being employed in a particular situation. The test set up in this doctrine is that support is being provided and control exercised across a border. The aggressor country in such a situation has always claimed that the violent resistance is a purely indigenous revolution. Persuasive proof will presumably have to take the form of intercepting communications or of prisoners who can be produced in sufficient numbers or of captured boats, trucks, or aircraft. If the support being rendered across the border is in a mild enough form (for instance limited to money payments), it will usually not be worthwhile to try to invoke this doctrine.

2. The most interesting concept in the doctrine is that of the

tactical offensive and of independence in the choice of weapons. As to the former, the advantages of carrying the war to the enemy's country are obvious. It is particularly unjust that the population which supplies most of the victims in guerrilla warfare should be that of the victim of aggression while the aggressor's people and lands are untroubled. As to the latter, it is indeed high time that we applied ingenuity to the choosing or the development of weapons which involve no major escalation in the degree of sophistication but in which for one reason or another our friends have a relative advantage in a given situation. For instance, small boat operations may be much easier in certain situations than the infiltration of guerrillas into enemy territory by land. We may be able to develop weapons (other than conventional bombs) that could be used from aircraft with effects having some similarity to those of sabotage carried out by teams on the ground.

Finally, although the doctrine as here stated makes no specific reference to covert activities, it has an important application to them. It would lose much of its value as operational policy unless, in its aspect as a rationale, it became widely known. Accordingly, it must be assumed that, even if not in some official manner announced by the US Government, public expression would be given to the rationale in various ways. This would have two implications. On the one hand, it would permit the US to support more or less openly certain activities which, without such rationale,

can be supported only covertly. In this way, the vague disclosure of the doctrine would permit the realm of covert paramilitary action to be narrowed. On the other hand, the political risks of certain covert actions would be significantly reduced, since a rationale for such actions would have been made known publicly.

Taking these two implications into account, it seems likely that it would still be desirable for tactically offensive actions, those involving the support of violence within the territory of the enemy, to be done in such a manner as to be at least officially disclaimable. The whole reason for limiting the scale and technical sophistication of a paramilitary action taken in response to violent subversion is to avoid escalation. This advantage is lost if an offensive operation against the aggressor is conducted in such a manner as to compel him to regard it as a formal act of war. Unless, therefore, the enormous advantages of being free to employ the tactical offensive are to be foregone, every precaution should be taken to make such acts symmetrical in form, as well as in scale and technical sophistication, to the strategic offensive originally mounted by the aggressor. This would usually require that the acts be disclaimable but, with the proposed new rationale, it is far less important that they be truly covert.

Application of this doctrine to the problems of negating externally-supported Communist inspired subversive violence in non-Communist underdeveloped countries should be actively considered. Apart from the

issues of the doctrine of non-intervention and the risks of escalation, however, there are several other factors that should be evaluated before undertaking specific operations against a Communist-controlled third-country base. These factors mainly concern the objectives to be achieved and the likelihood of attaining them without involving ourselves in implicit commitments that are greater than we wish to assume.

Offensive countermeasures are primarily intended as diversionary and harassment operations. They will serve as distractions and nuisances to facilitate achieving a defensive victory elsewhere. The enemy will have to deploy his forces both to contain these outbursts and to assure that any resultant unrest does not become the preliminary to a serious liberation movement. If an area where these activities are taking place explodes in the Communist face, as did Budapest, we will have some quick decisions to make on the pros and cons of exploiting the break, and we should be prepared to do so if it appears advisable. But the concept presumes that the operations will have achieved their purpose of diverting enemy forces from the offensive long before the boiling point of true popular insurrection is reached.

Here perhaps lies the main point of contention of the concept. It can be argued that if the enemy leaders believe there is real likelihood of their losing territory or being overthrown, the dangers of escalation through their over-reacting to the threat will increase sharply, and the policy of

offensive countermeasures will become almost unpredictably dangerous. The other side of this argument is that only a serious danger of losing control of a region will force the Communists to shift significant effort from other activities and that a succession of raids and minor depredations will not gain meaningful ends.

If indeed offensive countermeasures are successful only as diversions, and if the people of the region where they are undertaken cannot hope for the sustained large scale outside assistance needed to push through a successful insurrection, those people are more likely to be sullen than rebellious. A community which rises and fails in revolt loses its leaders and suffers grievously. Once burned they are thereafter twice wary. No matter how unpopular a Communist regime may be we cannot expect much help from the people in fighting it if we do not propose to see that the regime is overthrown. As T. E. Lawrence wrote of motivations in another revolt, "Freedom is a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive".

Under some circumstances in Communist areas, it may not be practical to count on the measure of local support essential to indigenous guerrillas even though they receive material aid from the outside. Hence, many offensive countermeasures will depend in large part on the work of specially trained men or groups introduced into the aggressor country to operate on a largely self-sufficient basis. While these groups may sometimes work with dissident local elements when such exist, they will have

few sources of information once they are in the field. This will place heavy and exacting loads on indigenous intelligence nets already organized and working in the area, and great care must be taken to assure that these nets are not compromised by direct association with the operating groups. The size of the groups committed to operations of this type can vary from the single agent up to whatever point the current risks of sharp escalation will bear.

Whatever the built-in limitations on cross-border operations, however, they may well be advantageous for us. They will offer the tactical values of destroying or disrupting supply lines and logistical installations vital to the Communist guerrillas and of causing some lessening or diversion of the Communist effort. They may also demonstrate to the people of the threatened country that its government, and such friendly non-Communist foreign powers as are supporting it, are resolved to carry the conflict to a successful conclusion and to reduce as far as possible the human and material losses of the friendly population. The psychological and political implications of this effect should reinforce the impact of our other overt and covert development and counter-subversion measures.

The successful orchestration of the total strategy discussed in this report may be expected to win the needed grass-roots popular support, to facilitate the negative aspects of countering Communist subversion and guerrilla operations, and to achieve a viable basis for sound long-term economic growth and social and political development.

V. Conclusions

1. Serious Communist intent and capability to press forward with the technique of subversive intervention, often extending to guerrilla warfare in various underdeveloped countries or regions, confront the US with a critical problem which will persist through the Sixties.

2. However, despite the clear consensus within the US Government as to the magnitude and urgency of this problem, we are not yet organized to help threatened countries to deal adequately with it. We have at our disposal a variety of potential resources and programs for facilitating the prevention of Communist subversive violence and for repressing active guerrillas, but these have not yet been harnessed by a unifying concept of operations, high level focus on the problem, and greater impetus to the development of programs commensurate to the need.

3. Such policies and programs cut across a wide spectrum of existing agency responsibilities. In particular, they will require concerted and carefully focussed civil and military actions by the State and Defense Departments, AID, USIA, and CIA.

4. But there is no single high-level locus of authority and responsibility within the Executive Branch to undertake this vitally needed concerting of inter-agency resources. There is no present coordinating mechanism, short of the NSC, which is empowered to provide the needed centralized direction of effort, and there is none which is devoting a significant share of its

energies to the peculiar requirements of the guerrilla warfare challenge and to its inter-agency program implications. Except for such country Task Forces as have been constituted in specific instances, there are no mechanisms for focussing Government-wide resources on identifying and finding solutions to the unique problems of particular countries. Moreover, present Task Forces for critical areas have lacked a source of guidance and support on the special problems of preventing and dealing with Communist subversive violence, and they have not always focussed sufficiently on these aspects.

5. Therefore, the most immediate need is for adequate institutional arrangements to ensure continuing focus on and attention to the problem at a high governmental level. Because of its responsibilities in directly related fields and because the agencies chiefly concerned are already represented on it, expansion of the mandate of the NSC Special Group seems the most effective way to carry out this function.

6. New arrangements are also needed to facilitate the stepping-up or reorientation of existing departmental and agency programs to achieve maximum effectiveness in those countries where the need is most critical, and to enable us to anticipate future needs. However, action responsibility for programs to prevent or counter subversive violence should continue to rest with the appropriate departments and agencies. Most of these programs also involve broader objectives. The preventive aspects of our diplomatic, economic aid, overt informational, and certain covert programs on behalf of

social, economic, and political progress in threatened countries are inevitably closely related to the totality of US foreign policy toward such countries.

VI. Recommendations

Accordingly it is proposed that:

1. The NSC Special Group, chaired by the Military Representative of the President, should be given the additional responsibility of providing focus and direction to interdepartmental programs for coping with threats of Communist subversive intervention, actual and potential, in nations and areas abroad which the President considers critical. Where appropriate, the Directors of the Agency for International Development and the US Information Agency would be invited to participate in Special Group deliberations in this field.

2. As a first step, the Special Group should recommend a directive delimiting and defining the new scope of its responsibility, to include the designation of the specific areas where subversive violence or guerrilla warfare is either already a major factor (e.g., South Vietnam, Laos, Colombia) or a potentially serious threat (e.g., Thailand, Iran, Bolivia). The designation criteria should be rigorously narrow so as to focus attention and resources on only the few most critical situations.

3. For countries or regions determined by the NSC Special Group to be critically threatened by Communist subversive violence and approved by the President for assignment to its jurisdiction, the Secretary of State in coordination with the department heads should constitute inter-agency country

or regional Task Forces in Washington (if not already in being), charged with the development and review of integrated action programs to deal with Communist violence or its threat in their geographic areas. The Task Forces would normally be chaired by senior State Department geographic officers at the Assistant Secretary level. If the endangered country is in an active US Military Theater of Operations or if the NSC Special Group determines that the military aspects of the country situation predominate, the Defense Department should assume the chairmanship. Members would be formally assigned and regard as primary their duties on the Task Force. Task Forces would report to and be under the guidance of the NSC Special Group on matters bearing directly on Communist-inspired violence.

4. In countries designated as critically threatened, the Country Teams should be charged with developing and forwarding integrated program recommendations and with ensuring effective local coordination in the execution of approved programs to counter the threat. The Country Teams would submit their recommendations and reports through normal channels to the chairmen of the competent Task Forces, who would keep the NSC Special Group informed of plans and progress.

5. The Special Group should also be responsible for focussing increased attention on those aspects of broader US Government programs which generate resources for the prevention or neutralization of Communist subversive intervention, e.g., Military Assistance Program (MAP), Overseas Internal Security

Program (OISP), certain specialized military forces and covert action programs. It should interest itself in the following types of problems, drawing on the informational resources and special skills of the various departments and agencies as appropriate:

a. The organization, equipment, funds, doctrine, and techniques required to improve the capabilities of designated threatened countries for internal security and counter-guerrilla measures. This may involve strengthening or initiating OISP activities, reorienting MAP activities to give increased emphasis to the counter-guerrilla training and equipping mission, or the provision of new authority, funds, facilities, personnel and equipment for CIA counter-guerrilla paramilitary operations.

b. Ways in which MAP and MAAG activities in threatened countries, possible supplemented by AID and CIA capabilities, can help realize the constructive economic and political potentialities of civic action by the armed forces of the countries.

c. The adequacy of current appropriations, fiscal procedures, and enabling legislation to satisfy indicated program needs, with possible requests for new Congressional authority to permit inter-agency transfers of funds and achieve greater flexibility for counter-violence aid programs.

6. While action responsibility for programs related to preventing or countering subversive violence would remain in existing departments and agencies, it is appropriate that the Special Group be authorized to comment

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or submit recommendations on the particular implications of such programs for the critical problems of deterring Communist subversions and violence, especially for the shorter-term purposes of winning local popular support away from the Communists. The Special Group would provide focus on counter-subversion implications of departmental critical area planning both through its collective guidance to the critical area Task Forces and through the instructions of individual Special Group members to their own area representatives through their respective departmental and agency channels. The Special Group would also review integrated critical area program proposals, prepared by the Task Forces in coordination with the senior US field representative, and would approve them for execution if they fall within existing policy. In the event of inter-agency disagreements, or actions requiring fresh policy determinations, the Special Group members would refer them to their respective principals.

7. Once a critical area inter-agency program had been approved, the Special Group would monitor its execution both through the appropriate Task Forces and through the departmental/agency channels of Special Group members. The main contribution of the Task Forces in the monitoring and review process would be in providing collective judgments, by country or region, on the adequacy of program objectives and achievements in relation to the problems of preventing or countering subversive violence.

8. In view of the sensitivity of covert action programs and the special

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procedures in effect for authorizing and reviewing them, covert aspects of counter-guerrilla warfare country and regional program planning and execution would be handled through special channels.

9. In considering action programs to counter Communist subversive intervention in designated critical areas, the Special Group and Task Forces should give attention to the possibilities for "offensive counter-measures", as discussed on pp. 33-43 of this report.

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